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Abstract:
A popular non-traditional capital formation option is the “PIPE” deal: Private Investment in
Public Equity. Over the last ten years, companies have raised more than $100 billion using PIPE
transactions. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has increased its regulatory oversight of
PIPE transactions as they have become more popular. The SEC believes that some PIPE investors who
take a short position in a PIPE issuer’s publicly traded shares violate Section 5 of the Securities Act by
selling unregistered securities, and that PIPE investors who trade on knowledge of an impending PIPE
transaction are guilty of insider trading. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the SEC’s
aggressive enforcement against PIPE deals is misguided both because it is based on flawed interpretations of
the law and because it ignores the benefits of PIPE financing. Although most of the existing scholarship on
PIPE financing shares the SEC’s negative views, these articles ignore the benefits and exaggerate the risks
associated with PIPE financing. This article makes the case for PIPE financing by fully considering its
benefits and risks.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Company X is a small public company with a promising idea, but cultivating this
idea into a marketable product will take time and money. The management of Company X
believes that its idea is close to yielding a product that will generate big returns for its
investors. Success seems right around the corner for Company X—if only Company X
could manage to stay afloat a little while longer. Company X, like many small public
companies in research-intensive businesses, is quickly burning through its cash. Company X
needs to raise more capital to bring its idea to market. Unfortunately, Company X is having
difficulty raising capital using traditional sources, a problem exacerbated by the current
global financial crisis.
Fortunately for Company X, there are alternative methods of raising capital. A
popular non-traditional capital formation option is the ―PIPE‖ deal: Private Investment in
Public Equity. PIPE deals have become popular because they offer investors greater
liquidity than conventional private placements, and because PIPE deals allow issuing
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companies to raise capital quickly and efficiently.1 PIPE deals also have the potential for
superior returns and other contractual features that enhance the investment‘s overall
security.2
PIPEs emerged as a capital financing alternative approximately twenty years ago.3
Initially, PIPEs were only used by small-capitalization companies that were desperate for
financing.4 Eventually, however, PIPEs became more popular among both the investment
community and issuers who recognized the versatility of the PIPE financing structure.5
The tremendous growth in PIPE transactions evidences the popularity of PIPE
deals.6 The number of PIPE deals increased from around 300 in 1996 to over 1200 in 2007.7
The total amount of capital raised in PIPE transactions also increased significantly over the
last decade. PIPE transactions raised $56 billion in 2007 compared to $4 billion in 1996.8 In
the last 10 years, companies raised more than $100 billion using PIPE transactions.9
The SEC has increased its regulatory oversight of PIPE transactions as they have
become more popular.10 The increasing complexity of PIPE transactions, as well as the
possibility of investor injury inherent in PIPE transactions, contributed to the SEC‘s
increased oversight.11 Some commentators believe the SEC‘s fears of investor injury have
Marc. I. Steinberg & Emmanuel U. Obi, Examining the Pipeline: A Contemporary Assessment of Private Investments in
Public Equity, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 1, 7, 20 (2008); see also STEVEN DRESNER & E. KURT KIM, PIPES 95-96
(Updated Ed. 2006); Leib M. Lerner, Disclosing Toxic PIPEs: Why the SEC Can and Should Expand the Reporting
Requirements Surrounding Private Investments in Public Equities, 58 BUS. LAW. 655, 656 (2003) (―A PIPE transaction
combines the speed and certainty of a private placement with the pricing benefits that flow from the increased
liquidity to purchasers of freely tradable, registered securities.‖); Michael C. Macchiarola, Get Shorty: Toward
Resurrecting the SEC’s Ill-Fated Pursuit of PIPE Arbitrageurs, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 8 (2009).
1

2

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 21.

3

Id. at 24.

Id. at 25; see also Zachary T. Knepper, Future-Priced Convertible Securities and the Outlook for “Death Spiral” SecuritiesFraud Litigation, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 359, 359 (2004) (noting that PIPE issuers ―tend to be small, thinly-traded,
and (most importantly) desperate for cash‖).
4

5

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 25.

6

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 9-11.

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 5; see also Sagient Research Systems, Inc., General Market Stats—All PIPEs,
http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/GStats.cfm?Type=6 (for up-to-date statistics).
7

8

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 5.

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 11. The amount of capital raised in PIPE transactions compared to capital
raised in traditional seasoned equity offerings also evidences PIPE deals‘ popularity. For a thorough discussion
of the reasons companies choose PIPEs versus seasoned equity offerings, see Hsuan-Chi Chen et al., The Choice of
Equity Selling Mechanisms: PIPEs versus SEOs, J. CORP. FIN (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1139887; see also Na Dai, The Rise of the PIPE Market, in
COMPANION TO PRIVATE EQUITY (Douglas Cumming ed., 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350950
(noting that in 2007 there were 377 seasoned equity offerings that collectively raised $75 billion); William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 381, 408 (2007) (noting a seasoned equity offering consists of
an issuer selling shares of common stock at a market discount to a syndicate of underwriters, and the
underwriters quickly resell the securities to the general public, while a PIPE deal is similar to a seasoned equity
offering, but instead of selling shares of common stock to a syndicate of underwriters, the issuer sells common
stock or securities convertible into common stock at a market discount to a syndicate of hedge funds).
9

10

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 32; Sjostrom, supra note 9, 382-83.

11

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 32; Sjostrom, supra note 9, 382-83.
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merit because issuing a large number of shares through a PIPE offering may dilute the value
of shares held by an issuing company‘s existing shareholders.12
Consequently, the SEC has increased its enforcement actions in the PIPE
transaction context.13 Many PIPE enforcement actions focus on the rules governing short
sales by PIPE investors.14 The SEC believes that some PIPE investors who take a short
position in a PIPE issuer‘s publicly traded shares violate Section 5 of the Securities Act by
selling unregistered securities, and that PIPE investors who trade on knowledge of an
impending PIPE transaction are guilty of insider trading.15
The SEC‘s positions on these legal issues do not withstand scrutiny, but the issues
on PIPE investor short sales are far from settled. Although a number of trial courts have
examined the SEC‘s positions, no appellate court has yet weighed in. The SEC recently filed
a high-profile appeal in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.16 This appeal examined whether
investors who trade on knowledge of an impending PIPE transaction are guilty of insider
trading.17 This appeal drew a lot of attention because the defendant is Mark Cuban, the
controversial owner of the National Basketball Association‘s Dallas Mavericks.18
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit declined to reach the District Court‘s broad holdings
regarding insider trading.19
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the SEC‘s aggressive enforcement
of PIPE deals is misguided, both because it is based on flawed interpretations of the law and
because it ignores the benefits of PIPE financing. Section I of the article gives background
on PIPE financing. Section II discusses the benefits of PIPE financing for issuers, their
shareholders, and PIPE investors. Section III explains why the SEC‘s aggressive
enforcement of PIPE deals is misguided.
Existing scholarship on PIPE financing is mostly negative, but these articles have
ignored the benefits and exaggerated the risks associated with PIPE financing. 20 This article
makes the case for PIPE financing by fully considering its benefits and risks.
12

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 32; Sjostrom, supra note 9, 382-83.

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 188-89; see SEC v. Mangan, 598 F. Supp. 2d 731 (W.D.N.C. 2008); SEC v.
Mangan, SEC Litigation Release No. 19,955 (Dec. 28, 2006); SEC. v. Langley Partners, SEC Litigation Release
No. 19,607 (Mar. 14, 2006); SEC v. Shane, SEC Litigation Release No. 19,227, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1158 (May 18,
2005); Complaint, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., (N.D. Ill 2003) (Civ. A. 03-C-1685) (2003 WL 22176223); see also
Complaint, SEC v. Rhino Advisors, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Civ. Action No. 03 CIV 1310 (RO)) (SEC filed a civil
cause of action against an investment adviser who allegedly directed a PIPE investor‘s short sales in a death spiral
litigation).
13

Jeffrey T. Hartlin, Despite Recent Setbacks in the Courts, the SEC Remains Focused on Short Sales in PIPE Transactions,
37 SEC. REG. L.J., Article 3 (2009).
14

15

Id.

16

SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).

17

Id. at 553.

18

Id. at 552.

19

Id. at 558.

See George L. Majoros, Jr., The Development of “PIPEs” in Today’s Private Equity Market, 51 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 493, 494 (2001) (taking a largely negative view of PIPE deals, focusing largely on the ―disastrous results‖
early PIPE deals produced); see also Knepper, supra note 4, at 360 (concluding that some private death spiral
litigation is warranted because PIPE investors who sell short damage PIPE issuers and innocent investors);
20
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OVERVIEW OF PIPE FINANCING
A. Description of PIPEs

A PIPE is generally defined as ―any privately negotiated equity or equity-linked
investment in a public company.‖21 PIPE stands for Private Investment in Public Equity,
and PIPE transactions can be understood by examining its acronym‘s components.22 First,
PIPEs are privately negotiated transactions between a narrow group of investors and a public
company.23 Second, PIPEs involve direct investments in companies.24 Third, PIPEs are used
by public companies to raise capital.25 Fourth, PIPEs involve the sale of equity or equitylinked investments.26
PIPE transactions involve a two-step process that combines features of a private
placement transaction with features of a registered public offering.27 The PIPE deal process
can be better understood by using Company X as an example.
First, prior to commencing the PIPE transaction, Company X probably sought
other forms of financing. If Company X was either unable to locate financing or unsatisfied
with the terms of the financing available, Company X would next contact various investment
banks to examine the possibility of PIPE financing. The investment banks then contact
hedge funds and other sophisticated investors to gauge interest in the PIPE deal.
Once interest in the PIPE transaction is ascertained, terms of the PIPE deal are
negotiated. PIPE transactions tend to be highly negotiated. Thus, there are often significant
differences between various PIPE deals with respect to the attributes of the PIPE
securities.28

B. Overview of Federal Securities Law Compliance Issues
Understanding the PIPE transaction process requires some understanding of federal
securities law compliance issues. First, it is important to understand why the private
placement component of a PIPE deal is necessary.
Lerner, supra note 1, at 658 (concluding that the SEC should expand disclosure rules covering death spiral PIPE
investors, particularly in the context of short sales); Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 15 (agreeing with the SEC‘s
position that PIPE investors who sell short PIPE issuer stock prior to public announcement of the PIPE
transaction, and subsequently use PIPE shares to close out the short position are guilty of violating Section 5‘s
prohibition on selling unregistered securities). For examples of neutral scholarly articles on PIPE financing, see
Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 413 (concluding it is an open question whether further regulation of PIPE financing is
warranted, and further regulation of PIPEs should be done in a measured and transparent manner); Steinberg &
Obi, supra note 1, at 47 (concluding that issuers and investors must both proceed with PIPEs in a strategic
manner given the uncertainty engendered by recent regulatory developments).
21

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 20.

22

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 2.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 20.

28

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 21.
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Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 governs registered public offerings.29 Section
5 makes it illegal for any person to sell securities unless the person has filed an effective
registration statement with the SEC.30 Section 5 is relevant to PIPE transactions for two
reasons: first, the private placement component of a PIPE transaction must comply with
Section 5‘s exemption requirements;31 and second, the resale of the securities after the
private offering triggers Section 5‘s requirements.32
Registration under Section 5 is both complicated and expensive.33 Section 5‘s
registration expense creates an incentive for businesses like Company X to utilize
exemptions to the registration requirement.34 Section 5 exemptions allow issuers like
Company X to sell securities without filing a registration statement.35 A number of
exemptions are particularly relevant to PIPEs, and perhaps the most relevant exemption is
the Section 4(2) private placement exemption.36

1.

Private Placement Compliance

PIPE transactions start with a private placement transaction.37 The private
placement exemption states that all ―transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering‖ are not subject to the Section 5 registration requirement.38 The purpose of Section
4(2)‘s exemption is to excuse sales when there is either no need for registration or when the
benefits of registration are too attenuated.39 Utilizing the private placement exemption is
cheaper and more convenient than Section 5 registration, but compliance with the private
placement exemption has historically been challenging due to the lack of statutory guidance
with respect to its application.40 Consequently, issuers have sometimes relied on ambiguous
judicial and administrative interpretations in attempting to understand how to comply with
the private placement exemption.
The most often cited judicial interpretation of the private placement exemption is
the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina.41 In Ralston Purina, the
Supreme Court examined whether a public corporation offering company stock to all
employees qualified for the Section 4(2) exemption. The primary conclusion of Ralston
Purina is that the critical inquiry in determining the applicability of the private placement
29

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 6-7.

30

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 6-7.

31

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 78.

32

Id.

33

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 7.

34

Id. at 7.

35

Id. at 11.

36

Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 7.

37

Id.

38

Id.; see also DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 78-79.

39

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 12; see also DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 78.

40

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 12.

41

Id. at 12; SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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exemption is whether the offerees are able to ―fend for themselves,‖ thus making
registration unnecessary.42
Ralston Purina and later lower court decisions have explained several factors in
determining how to apply the private placement exemption including:
the number of offerees and their relationships to each other and to the
issuer; the manner of the offering; the sophistication and expertise of the
offerees; the nature and type of information provided to offerees either
directly or indirectly . . . and the precautions employed by the issuer to
prevent the resale of the underlying securities.43
However, it is difficult for issuers to determine, even using these factors, whether
the Section 4(2) private placement exemption applies to some private placements.
Accordingly, the Rule 506 (of Regulation D) safe harbor has become the primary exemption
used in PIPE offerings.44
Rule 506 serves as a Section 4(2) private placement exemption safe harbor.45
Compliance with the Rule 506 safe harbor is not nearly as difficult or complicated. An
offering qualifies for the Section 4(2) private placement exemption if an issuer satisfies Rule
506‘s requirements.46 Regulation D, including Rule 506, was designed to give investors
greater certainty than could be obtained by relying on Ralston Purina and other judicial and
administrative interpretations.47 However, an investor‘s failure to satisfy Regulation D does
not preclude the investor from relying on Section 4(2).48
Applying Rule 506 is different than applying Section 4(2). Section 4(2) focuses on
offerees, whereas Rule 506 generally focuses on purchasers.49 Rule 506 prohibits more than
35 non-accredited purchasers and allows an unlimited number of accredited investors.50
42

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 12.

43

Id. at 12-13.

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 17; see also DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 80-81 (noting that Regulation D,
which provides issuers with safe harbors from registration requirements, was promulgated by the SEC in 1982 to
―provide issuers with greater certainty than reliance on interpretations of the Section 4(2) exemption‖).
44

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 18; see also Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 391 (noting that ―if a private offering
complies with the conditions specified in Rule 506, the offering will be deemed exempt under Section 4(2)‖).
45

46

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 18.

47

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 80.

48

Id.

49

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 18.

Id. The federal securities laws define the term ―accredited investor‖ in Rule 501 of Regulation D as (1) a bank,
insurance company, registered investment company, business development company, or small business
investment company; (2) a private business development company as defined in the Investment Advisers Act of
1940; (3) a charitable organization, corporation, or partnership with assets exceeding $5 million; (4) a director,
executive officer, or general partner of the company selling the securities; (5) a business in which all the equity
owners are accredited investors; (6) a natural person who has individual net worth, or joint net worth with the
person‘s spouse, that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase; (7) a natural person with income exceeding
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years
and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year; or (8) a trust with assets in excess of $5
million, not formed to acquire the securities offered, whose purchases are made by a sophisticated person. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.50(a) (2011) (defining ―accredited investor‖); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125
50
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As PIPE investors in a Rule 506 offering are typically all accredited investors, Rule
506 compliance problems are rare in PIPE deals.51 Almost all hedge funds qualify as
accredited investors under the Rule 506 safe harbor, and PIPE transactions are usually
marketed to accredited investors so the issuer does not have to comply with the disclosure
requirements for unaccredited investors.52 The only SEC filing required in a Rule 506
offering is a nine page Form D that discusses basic information about the offering. 53 Form
D must be filed within 15 days after the first sale of securities.54 Because securities issued
pursuant to Rule 506 are considered restricted securities, PIPE investors cannot generally sell
the securities for at least one year, unless the subsequent sale is registered with the SEC.55
Executing the private placement component of a PIPE transaction requires one
more step than traditional private placement transactions. Before the private placement
component of a PIPE transaction is completed, the PIPE issuer covenants to file a
registration statement covering the shares purchased in the private placement transaction.56
This step ensures that PIPE investors will be able to sell the shares on the open market once
the PIPE shares have been registered and the SEC declares the resale registration effective.57

2.

Public Offering Compliance

Ensuring compliance with federal securities laws during the secondary or public
offering component of a PIPE transaction involves filing a registration statement and
avoiding integration issues. The secondary offering or resale of securities in PIPE
transactions typically requires the issuer to file a registration statement.58 Most PIPE
transactions register using Form S-3.59 Form S-3 utilizes a condensed reporting form that
allows issuers to incorporate required information by reference to information contained in
the company‘s quarterly and annual reports.60 Form S-3 is used in most PIPE transactions
because it is less time consuming and less expensive than other registration forms.61
In addition to registration statement issues, the secondary offering component of a
PIPE transaction also implicates integration issues. Integration occurs when two or more
offerings, which an issuer structures as separate exempt offerings, are treated by the SEC as
a single non-exempt offering.62 The purpose of integration is to prevent issuers from
(1953) (touchstone of private offering exemption is that offerees are able to ―fend for themselves‖ and thus do
not need protection of federal securities laws).
51

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 18.

52

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 391-92.

53

Id. at 392.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 392-93.

56

Id. at 393; see also Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 8.

57

Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 8.

58

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 393.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 393-94.

62

Id. at 395; DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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structuring a single offering into multiple offerings to avoid the Securities Act‘s registration
requirement.63 If the SEC integrates multiple offers so that the single offer does not qualify
for an exemption, then the offers were made in violation of the Securities Act. 64
Consequently, each purchaser in the offering has a right to rescind the transaction. 65
Integration is relevant to PIPE transactions because PIPEs involve two distinct offerings: a
private offering followed by a public offering.66 Fortunately for PIPE investors, integration
is seldom an issue in PIPE transactions because of Securities Act Rule 152.67
Under Rule 152, offerings made prior to the registration statement‘s filing and made
under circumstances that did not require registration do not become offerings which are
prohibited by the Securities Act because of the subsequent registration.68 Therefore,
integration will not be an issue in PIPE transactions as long as the private offering complies
with a Section 5 registration exemption, and the issuer completes the offering before the
filing of the registration statement.69

C. Structural Alternatives
PIPEs come in many varieties, and the two most common forms of PIPE
transactions are traditional PIPEs and structured PIPEs.

1.

Traditional PIPEs

In traditional PIPEs, ―the issuing company covenants to file a registration statement
covering the applicable securities with the SEC promptly after the closing of the private
offering made pursuant to Rule 506.‖70 A typical traditional PIPE involves selling common
stock at a fixed price and at a discount or premium of the market price depending on the
contractual features of the PIPE.71 Some traditional PIPEs also involve selling convertible
preferred stock.72

63

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 395.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 395-96.

Stephen M. Graham, Financing Alternatives for Public Companies, 1704 PRAC. L. INST. 369, 383 (2008) (―Failure to
complete the private placement before filing the registration statement would vitiate the exemption for the
private placement (resulting in a ‗burst‘ PIPE), because the SEC takes the position that filing a registration
statement constitutes a ‗general solicitation,‘ which would make a private placement exemption unavailable.‖).
69

70

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 21-22.

Id. at 22; see also DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 99-101 (noting the basic terms of a traditional PIPE include
the following: ―standard representations and warranties . . . that must be brought down at closing; delivery to the
placement agent of a comfort letter and legal opinion . . . ; before an investor obtains unlegended stock
certificates, delivery by the investor to the issuer and the issuer‘s transfer agent of a certificate as to the investor‘s
compliance with the prospectus delivery requirement; closing conditions limited to (1) no occurrence of any
material adverse change between execution and closing, and (2) the SEC‘s willingness to declare effective the
resale registration statement‖).
71

72

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 22.
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Structured PIPEs

Structured PIPEs typically utilize preferred stock or debt securities that are
convertible into the company‘s common stock.73 An investor‘s obligations in a structured
PIPE are often contingent upon the SEC declaring effective a registration statement
covering the securities.74 Structured PIPE closings are generally delayed until the registration
statement is effective. This feature allows PIPE investors to walk away from the transaction
if registration does not occur.75
Another advantage some structured PIPEs offer is a variable and contractually
linked reset mechanism that adjusts the conversion price downwards if the company‘s
common stock market price falls below set conversion prices.76 Accordingly, one
commentator stated that structured PIPE investors ―do not assume price risk during the
pendency of the resale registration statement.‖77 Consequently, a structured PIPE is often
more advantageous for PIPE investors than for PIPE issuers.78 In fact, some structured
PIPEs can cause tremendous downward movement in issuer stock prices.

3.

―Death Spiral‖ Structured PIPEs

Some commentators have dubbed the most notorious structured PIPE deal a
―death spiral.‖79 In a death spiral, the PIPE issuer sells the PIPE investor convertible debt.80
When PIPE investors convert debt into equity, this creates more shares and dilutes the share
price.81 This creates an incentive for PIPE investors to convert more debt because the lower
price allows the investor to receive more shares.82 Further conversions cause more price
drops as the supply of shares increases; as the process repeats itself, the stock‘s price

Id. at 23; see also DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 105-06 (noting the standard terms of a structured PIPE
transaction include the following: ―[a] private placement is . . . made to selected accredited investors; [i]nvestors
commit to purchase securities at a fixed price or at a variable/reset price; [f]or transactions involving
variable/reset pricing . . . parameters – which may include a cap on the number of shares that may be issued; [t]he
purchase agreement generally contains a limitation on blackout periods; [p]romptly following execution of
purchase agreements with investors, the transaction funds and closes; [t]he issuer files a resale registration
statement covering resales from time to time of securities sold in the transaction; [t]he issuer may be obligated to
make penalty payments if it fails to meet any registration statement deadline; [i]nvestors are named in the resale
registration statement as ‗Selling Stockholders‘; [t]he resale registration statement is kept effective until securities
may be sold under Rule 144(k)‖).
73

74

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 23.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 384-85.

78

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 23-24.

See id; see also Knepper, supra note 4, at 361-62 (noting that these types of structured PIPE deals are also known
as future-priced convertible securities, toxic PIPEs, resetting convertibles, floorless convertibles, and toxic
convertibles); Death Spiral, INVESTOPEDIA, available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deathspiral.asp
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (defining ―death spiral‖).
79

Death Spiral, INVESTOPEDIA, available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deathspiral.asp (last visited
Mar. 3, 2011).
80

81

Id.

82

Id.
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decreases.83 Downward price pressures in death spirals are often exacerbated by short
selling, and the process creates a vicious circle—the ―death spiral.‖84
―Death‖ applies because issuer stocks often performed poorly subsequent to the
consummation of the PIPE transaction. In fact, many early death spiral issuers experienced
catastrophic losses subsequent to consummating the PIPE deal.85 Consequently, a
significant amount of early scholarly articles on PIPE financing discussed how to deal with
the death spiral problem.86 In fact, one commentator suggested that it was the dramatic
losses experienced by death spiral issuers and the sense that death spiral investors were
―vultures‖ benefiting from the destruction of small companies that led to the SEC‘s
increased scrutiny and enforcement in the PIPE context.87 This interpretation is bolstered
by the SEC‘s public comments.
Thomas Newkirk, Associate Director of the SEC‘s Division of Enforcement, said
the following about death spiral financing: ―[c]ertain convertible securities, particularly those
referred to as ‗toxic‘ or ‗death spiral‘ convertibles, present the temptation for persons
holding the convertible securities to engage in manipulative short selling of the issuer‘s stock
in order to receive more shares at the time of conversion.‖88 Director Newkirk‘s comment
was made in the context of a death spiral litigation settlement and he further highlighted the
SEC‘s desire to address death spiral financing issues: ―This case demonstrates this risk to
issuers and investors. The $1 million penalty imposed here shows the Commission‘s
determination to address these abuses.‖89
However, the injuries associated with death spiral PIPEs no longer exist in
American Securities markets. Industry leaders,90 news outlets,91 investment commentators,92

83

Id.

84

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 24.

85

See Knepper, supra note 4, at 359-60.

See generally Knepper, supra note 4; Lerner, supra note 1; Majoros, supra note 20 (describing potential solutions to
death spiral issues).
86

87

See generally Lerner, supra note 1 (describing SEC regulation and enforcement of PIPEs).

SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC Settles with Rhino Advisors, Thomas Badian (2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-26.htm.
88

89

Id.

Telephone Interview with Colin Lancaster, President & Chief Operating Officer, Stark Investments (Nov. 24,
2009) (noting death spiral PIPEs no longer occur in the United States but do occur in other parts of the world).
90

See Erik Krusch, Corporate Finance: PIPEs, RDOs and ELFs Driving Liquidity, WESTLAW BUSINESS CURRENTS,
Nov. 6, 2009, http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/2009/11/20091103_ 0021.aspx?src=WBSignon
(―The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) killed off the PIPE death spiral earlier this decade through
pointed comment letters and enforcement actions.‖).
91

See Mary Moore, PIPE Financing Sheds Off Bad Rap and Sluggish Activity, BOSTON BUS. J., Nov. 12, 2007, available
at http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2007/11/12/focus4.html (―With tightening by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, death spirals are nearly non-existent among today‘s PIPEs, industry experts said, and
the market is attracting increasing numbers of traditional, well-heeled firms that are doing bigger deals than ever
before.‖).
92
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financial scholars,93 and members of SEC advisory committees94 agree that death spiral
PIPEs have basically disappeared from the American marketplace.
Most commentators attribute the disappearance of death spiral PIPEs to: 1)
increased competition among hedge funds vying for PIPE investments resulting in more
favorable terms for PIPE issuers;95 2) increased SEC scrutiny, particularly in screening PIPE
registrations;96 and 3) greater awareness and appreciation among PIPE issuers of the risks
associated with death spiral PIPEs.97 That death spiral PIPE financing and its catastrophic
effects no longer exist in the United States marketplace is important because it should
alleviate the stigma associated with early PIPE deals.

III.

BENEFITS OF PIPE TRANSACTIONS

Current PIPE transactions include different benefits for PIPE issuers and PIPE
investors, and this article discusses the benefits to both.

A. Benefits to PIPE Issuers
PIPE issuers like Company X generally choose PIPE transactions over other
financing alternatives because PIPE issuers often have no other alternatives and because
PIPE financing offers advantages over traditional capital formation options.98 For example,
PIPE financing requires lower transaction expenses, fewer public disclosure requirements,
less preparation, and less time than traditional capital formation options.99
See Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that death spirals have largely been relegated to the sidelines in
the context of PIPE transactions).
93

See David Feldman, SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Record of Proceedings 166 (June
17, 2005) available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/ acspctranscript061705.pdf (noting that ―[t]he
death spiral deals are a thing of the past for the most part‖).
94

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that the terrible effects of death spirals led to innovative solutions
from private and public sectors which led to disappearance of death spirals); see also PIPEs: Quick Financing, the
Hail Mary Pass and New Investors, FIN. ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/News/PR11.15.04FinEngineering.htm (suggesting that death spirals are
rare because there are so many PIPE investors willing to agree to more issuer friendly terms).
95

See Laura Anthony, The Demise of the Death Spiral – SEC Interpretation of Rule 415, LEGAL & COMPLIANCE, LLC,
Oct. 22, 2009, http://securities-law-blog.com/2009/10/22/the-demise-of-the-death-spiral-sec-interpretation-ofrule-415/ (―The SEC staff made it clear that its interpretation of Rule 415 was meant to curtail death spirals and
other toxic offerings which tended to flood the market with penny stocks whose value continued to decline. The
SEC‘s efforts worked.‖); Moore, supra note 92 (noting death spirals‘ non-existence is due to ―tightening by the
Securities and Exchange Commission‖); see also Krusch, supra note 91 (―The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) killed off the PIPE death spiral earlier this decade through pointed comment letters and
enforcement actions.‖).
96

See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Alan L. Beller, SEC Investor Summit, (May 10, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/summit/isummit051002.htm. When asked about the SEC‘s view on death spiral
convertibles, Director Beller stated: ―This is a relatively recent phenomenon that I guess one might hope has run
its course. I think a lot of the earlier issuances of death spiral preferreds were due in part, frankly, to an underappreciation of their consequences to issuers and in the marketplace. I think those consequences are now much
better understood, and our anecdotal evidence, at least, is that one is seeing less of this.‖ Director Beller also
noted that increased disclosure rules would likely decrease the amount of death spiral convertibles in the future.
Id.
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Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 386.
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DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 100.
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Most PIPE issuers are small public companies.100 Although some PIPE issuers may
eventually generate tremendous wealth, PIPE issuers typically have small market
capitalizations, weak cash flow, and poor-performing stocks.101 Some PIPE issuers are ―in
high-growth or research-intensive businesses and have a continuing need for cash.‖102 Most
PIPE issuers will run out of cash within a year without additional financing; therefore,
traditional financing is generally not an option.103 Few investment banks are willing to
finance PIPE issuers like Company X, and often, PIPE issuers lack the upside potential to
attract traditional private equity financing.104
PIPE financing requires lower transaction expenses than other financing
alternatives. For example, the cost of conducting a registered offering pursuant to the
Securities Act is frequently substantial.105 ―[T]he costs of preparing the registration
statement, including accountant, attorney, investment banker and printer fees, easily can run
into the tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars.‖106 Additionally, one commentator
concluded that PIPEs are more cost-effective for issuers because PIPEs allow issuers to
bypass road shows and advertising that are usually required for successful public offerings.107
Furthermore, PIPE financing requires less preparation than other financing
alternatives because PIPE financing has fewer public disclosure requirements.108 The
disclosures required in preparing a public offering registration statement are detailed and
complex, and the document‘s length can be massive.109 PIPE transactions, on the other
hand, are commonly closed ―within seven to ten days of receiving definitive purchase
commitments whereas a follow-on underwritten equity offering can take from three to nine
months.‖110 PIPEs can be completed quickly because they are structured to avoid preclosing SEC review and clearance, and because PIPE investors typically perform less due
diligence on PIPE issuers than underwriters in a public offering.111
Finally, PIPE financing carries potential long-term benefits for PIPE issuer
shareholders. PIPE issuer shareholders derivatively enjoy the benefits that PIPE issuers
enjoy. PIPE deals make it more likely that PIPE issuers like Company X will get their ideas
to market, and PIPE issuer shareholders thus benefit. Conversely, if Company X is unable
100

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 386.

101

Id.

102 DRESNER &

KIM, supra note 1, at 66.

103

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 386-87.

104

Id. at 387.

MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 38-39 (4th ed. 2007); see also DRESNER & KIM, supra
note 1, at 100.
105

106

STEINBERG, supra note 105, at 38-39.

107

Lerner, supra note 1, at 664.

108

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 100.

109

Id.

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 386 n.34 (citing James R. Tanenbaum & Anna T. Pinedo, The Law: Legal and
Regulatory Framework, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 77, 100 (rev. & updated
ed. 2006)).
110

111

Id.
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to locate financing and later goes out of business, its shareholders will lose their investments.
Accordingly, the potential benefits that PIPE issuer shareholders enjoy are generally
associated with the increased likelihood that the PIPE issuer will stay in business.

B. Benefits to PIPE Investors
Hedge funds are the biggest investors in PIPE transactions.112 Hedge funds do not
have a universal definition. The term ―hedge fund‖ generally refers to privately managed
investment funds that are exempt from many securities laws.113 Hedge funds are generally
exempt from the 1933 Securities Act‘s public offering requirements, the 1934 Exchange
Act‘s periodic reporting requirements, and the 1940 Investment Company Act‘s registration
requirements.114 Hedge funds are distinct from financial market players such as
underwriters, market makers, or broker-dealers that are specifically regulated by other federal
legislation.115 These exemptions, which are consistent with the purposes of securities
regulation, allow hedge funds to employ complex trading strategies that would otherwise be
prohibited or less effective.116 When hedge funds avoid SEC regulation, it is not the result
of dishonest behavior; rather, it is because hedge funds are ―structured in an open and
above-board fashion to take advantage of the exclusions that Congress has seen fit to build
into the securities laws regime.‖117
Hedge funds invest in PIPE transactions because PIPE transactions offer investors
1) more liquidity than private placements;118 2) greater security than private placements and
traditional equity offerings;119 and 3) superior returns compared to private placements and
traditional equity offerings.120
First, PIPE transactions offer investors more liquidity than private placements.121
PIPE investors reduce the illiquidity associated with private placements by requiring PIPE
issuers to file a registration statement, which is later declared effective, covering the stock
issued in the PIPE transaction. Once the registration statement is declared effective, PIPE
investors have the option of selling PIPE shares in the public market.122 Consequently,
PIPE deals provide investors with a cost-effective exit from their investment.123 PIPE
112

DRESNER & KIM, supra note 1, at 68; Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 382.

Erik J. Greupner, Hedge Funds are Down-Market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555,
1558-59 (2003).
113
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Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 7 (2006).
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 4-5.

Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 976 (2006).
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Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 20.
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See generally Lerner, supra note 1, at 656 (discussing increased liquidity from PIPE transactions).
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Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 382, 387-88 (noting PIPE deals earn hedge funds market-beating returns).

Lerner, supra note 1, at 656 (―A PIPE transaction combines the speed and certainty of a private placement
with the pricing benefits that flow from the increased liquidity to purchasers of freely tradable, registered
securities.‖).
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Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 8.
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See generally Graham, supra note 69 (discussing this cost-effective exit strategy).
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investors often include penalty provisions ―requiring an issuer to make payments if the resale
registration statement fails to become effective within prescribed time periods.‖124
Second, PIPE transactions offer investors greater security than private placements
and traditional equity offerings. PIPE deal structures present less investment risk than
private placements and traditional equity offerings for two reasons: (1) PIPE investors
purchase issuer stock or securities convertible into stock at a discount of market prices; and
(2) PIPE investors hedge their investment by selling short the PIPE issuer stock.125 So on
one hand, PIPE investors purchase issuer stock or securities convertible into stock at a
discount of market prices.126 In fact, the discount provided to PIPE investors is ―more
advantageous than the discount generally applicable in a pure private placement
transaction.‖127 On the other hand, PIPE investors hedge their investment by selling short
the PIPE issuer stock. To execute a short sale, an investor borrows common stock from a
broker-dealer and sells this borrowed stock on the open market.128 The investor then covers
the short sale at a later date by buying shares in the open market and returning these shares
to the lender.129 Short selling is profitable when the stock price drops because the investor
buys the stock at a lower price and makes a profit on the difference.130 Conversely, investors
lose money on short sales when the stock price rises.131 PIPE investor short sales insure
against possible decreases in the value of PIPE issuer stock.
Third, PIPE transactions offer investors superior returns compared to private
placements and traditional equity offerings.132 Hedge funds, the primary investor in PIPEs,
typically use an absolute return approach to investing.133 An absolute return approach to
investing seeks to make money in various market environments, including declining
markets.134 One commentator suggests that hedge funds can make money on PIPE deals
regardless of whether the common stock price increases or decreases subsequent to the
transaction.135 If the common stock price decreases below the discounted price following a
PIPE deal, the hedge fund will lose money on the PIPE shares, but the loss will be exceeded
by gains on the short sale.136 If the common stock price increases following a PIPE deal, the
money lost on the short sale will be exceeded by an increase in the common stock value
124

Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 9.

Id.; see also Alan J. Berkeley & Erin E. Troy, PIPEs Hedging Under Scrutiny, SP038 ALI-ABA 597, 600 (2009);
Graham, supra note 69, at 377; Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 21; Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 388.
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127

Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 21.

128

Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 388.

129

Id.
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because the shares were purchased at a discounted price.137 However, an industry leader
stated that there can still be tremendous risk for PIPE investors because (1) the distressed
state of PIPE issuers increases the risk of misrepresentation or fraud; and (2) PIPE investors
often carry a net ―long‖ profile—they believe in the company and will lose money in a down
market, even if partially hedged.138
Nevertheless, PIPE financing can be very lucrative for PIPE investors due to PIPE
issuers‘ few financing options.139 In addition to offering common stock at discounted prices
to PIPE investors, PIPE issuers are usually required to offer dividends, interest, and
warrants.140 Some commentators have estimated that PIPE financing costs between 14.3%
and 34.7%.141 The fact that PIPE issuers often perform poorly subsequent to PIPE
transactions is not surprising when one considers PIPE issuers‘ financially distressed state
and PIPE financing‘s high costs.142

IV.

SEC’S PUBLIC POSITIONS ON PIPE INVESTOR SHORT SALES

The SEC‘s aggressive enforcement against PIPE investors is misguided because it is
based on flawed interpretations of the law, and because it ignores the benefits and
exaggerates the risks of PIPE financing. The SEC believes that some PIPE investors who
take a short position in a PIPE issuer‘s publicly traded shares violate Section 5 of the
Securities Act by selling unregistered securities and that PIPE investors who trade on
knowledge of an impending PIPE transaction are guilty of insider trading.143 The SEC‘s
positions on these issues do not withstand scrutiny.
Unfortunately, there are currently no appellate decisions examining the SEC‘s
positions on PIPE investor short sales. Thus, PIPE investors are left with four options
when faced with a potential PIPE deal: PIPE investors can risk an SEC enforcement action
by proceeding with short selling strategies; proceed with a less secure investment by failing
to sell short the PIPE issuer‘s stock; increase the issuer‘s cost of financing; or abandon the
PIPE deal altogether.144 Regrettably, there is no reason to believe that appellate guidance is
imminent on either the issue of PIPE deal insider trading or the issue of Section 5
unregistered sales of securities.

137

Id.

E-mail Interview with Colin Lancaster, President & Chief Operating Officer, Stark Investments (Feb. 19,
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A. The SEC’s Flawed Interpretations of the Law
1.

Section 5 Unregistered Sale of Securities

The SEC is aggressively enforcing its position that short selling by PIPE investors
violates Section 5.145 The SEC‘s Section 5 position is misguided because the conduct in
question does not involve a sale or transfer of unregistered securities, and the SEC‘s position
is inconsistent with the purpose of Section 5 of the Securities Act.146
Section 5(a) of the Securities Act prohibits selling securities through interstate
commerce or the mails, when a registration statement is not in effect as to that security, or
an exemption from registration is not available.147 The same prohibition applies under
Section 5(c) to an offer to sell a security.148 The elements of a Section 5 violation are that ―1)
the defendant offered to sell or sold a security, 2) the defendant did so through the use of
mails or interstate commerce, and 3) no registration statement was filed or was in effect as to
that security.‖149
The SEC asserts that the short sales conducted in connection with PIPE deals
―constitute Section 5 violations ‗because shares used to cover a short sale are deemed to
have been sold when the short sale was made.‘‖150 Identifying the weakness of the SEC‘s
argument requires an understanding of short sales.
The principles underlying short sales are not complicated.151 ―A short sale is the sale
of a security that the seller does not yet own (or owns but chooses not to deliver).‖152 A
short seller borrows the securities from another party and ―delivers the borrowed security to

See, e.g., SEC v. Langley Partners, SEC Litigation Release No. 19,607 (Mar. 14, 2006); SEC v. Shane, SEC
Litigation Release No. 19,227, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1158 (May 18, 2005); Complaint, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 03C1685, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17933 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see also SEC v. Mangan, SEC Litigation Release No. 19,955
(Dec. 28, 2006).
145

See generally SEC v. Mangan, 598 F. Supp. 2d 731 (W.D.N.C. 2008); SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining the SEC‘s Section 5 position). The arguments against the SEC‘s Section 5 position
are well articulated in Mangan‘s trial brief, available at Mangan Brief, SEC v. Mangan, No. 3:06-cv-531, 598 F.
Supp. 2d 731, 2007 WL 4901007 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2008).
146
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the short-sale purchaser, thereby completing the trade.‖153 The short seller is still required to
return the securities to the party that lent them; this is known as ―covering‖ the short
position.154 A short seller typically covers the short position by repurchasing the security in
the marketplace.
Short sales are typically viewed as either a bet that a security will decrease in value,
or a hedge that mitigates the risk of loss if a security decreases in value. Typically, short
sellers earn profits if ―the stock‘s price falls between the time the short sale trade is made and
the time the short sale is covered.‖155 If the stock price increases after the short sale, the
short seller will incur a loss.156 PIPE investors often have a net long position, so PIPE
investor short sales may be best characterized as hedges.
The SEC‘s Section 5 position is wrong because Section 5 is not violated; the
conduct in question does not involve a sale or transfer of unregistered securities. PIPE
transactions are structured to make the sale or transfer of an unregistered security
impossible. When a PIPE investor opens a short position, it borrows and sells a registered
security. If the PIPE shares are successfully registered, PIPE investors then typically close
out the short position with (their own) registered shares. If the shares are never registered,
the PIPE investor would be forced to close out the short position with shares purchased on
the open market, which are registered. Consequently, it is impossible for the PIPE investor
to sell an unregistered security even if the PIPE shares are not successfully registered.
Furthermore, the SEC‘s position does not further the purpose of Section 5 of the
Securities Act.157 The primary purpose of Section 5 of the Securities Act is to protect
investors by promoting full disclosure of information necessary to make informed
investment decisions.158 Professor Sjostrom explains why the SEC‘s position does not
increase disclosure:
Whether a PIPE investor covers short sales with PIPE shares or open
market purchases has no impact on an issuer‘s disclosure obligations.
Disclosure regarding the resale of PIPE shares will be set forth in the resale
registration statement, and this disclosure will be the same regardless of the
type of shares used by a PIPE investor to cover a short position.159
In addition to failing to fulfill the purpose of Section 5, the SEC‘s Section 5 position
has not persuaded the few trial courts that have examined it. PIPE investors have recently
been named as defendants in three cases that went to trial. In all three cases, the courts held
that the SEC had no basis to allege that the delivery of PIPE shares to close a short position
effectively converted the underlying short sale into an unregistered resale of the PIPE shares
153
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156
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Sjostrom, supra note 9, at 406 (Professor Sjostrom points out that ―[t]he SEC‘s position may make sense
conceptually. It does not, however, appear to further the policy behind Section 5‖).
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SEC v. Lybrand, No. 00Civ.1387(SHS), 2000 WL 913894, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Macchiarola, supra
note 1, at 4-5 (The primary purpose of the Securities Act ―was to provide full and fair disclosure on the special
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at the time of the short sale.160 These holdings contradict the SEC‘s public position on short
selling by PIPE investors, but the SEC has not appealed any of them.
The SEC interpretation of Section 5 of the Securities Act related to PIPE investor
short sales went unchallenged for some time.161 The SEC, based on its reading of Section 5,
repeatedly extracted disgorgement and penalties from PIPE investors who preferred to settle
rather than challenge the SEC‘s interpretation.162 This came to a screeching halt when John
Mangan, Jr. decided to challenge the SEC‘s interpretation.
In SEC v. Mangan, the SEC alleged that John Mangan, Jr. sold short shares of a
PIPE issuer prior to and after the public announcement of the PIPE transaction.163 Once
the registration statement became effective, Mangan used the shares he purchased in the
PIPE transaction to close his short position.164 The SEC asserted that Mangan‘s short sales
violated Section 5 of the Securities Act because the SEC believed Mangan ―sold‖ the shares
when he opened the short position.165
The SEC‘s argument did not prevail, and the court granted Mangan‘s motion to
dismiss the charges.166 In dismissing the unregistered securities claim, the court stated that
Mangan did not violate existing securities laws:
[a]nd what we have here, it seems to me, is a post hoc ergo propter hoc
argument by the government that because the PIPE in fact was not
registered and because the PIPE shares were later in fact used, he in effect
sold the PIPE. Well, maybe, but I don‘t think he [Mangan] did anything
illegal. In short, no sale of unregistered securities occurred as a matter of
law.167
The Mangan court‘s decision and attitude towards the SEC‘s position were not
isolated. In SEC v. Lyon, the SEC alleged that Edwin Lyon, a hedge fund manager, sold
short shares of PIPE issuers prior to the registration statement‘s effectiveness.168 Once the
registration statement became effective, Lyon used the shares he purchased in the PIPE
transactions to close his short positions.169 The SEC asserted, as it did in Mangan, that
Lyon‘s short sales violated Section 5 of the Securities Act because Lyon effectively sold the
shares when he opened the short positions.170
See generally Julie Spellman Sweet, PIPEs: A Review of Key Legal Issues, 1761 PRAC. L. INST. 371, 395-403 (2009)
(discussing SEC v. Mangan, SEC v. Lyon, and SEC v. Berlacher).
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The Lyon court dismissed all of the SEC‘s Section 5 claims brought against Lyon.
Most importantly, the Lyon court stated that the SEC‘s allegations had ―not stated a plausible
claim . . . for distributing unregistered securities.‖171 Despite the setbacks in Mangan and
Lyon, the SEC continued to use its Section 5 argument, and was once again challenged in
SEC v. Berlacher.
In SEC v. Berlacher, the SEC alleged that Robert Berlacher, a hedge fund operator,
violated Section 5 of the Securities Act when Berlacher used shares purchased in a PIPE deal
to close out a short position.172 Like the Lyon and Mangan courts, the Berlacher court
dismissed the charges related to the short sales.173
The SEC‘s trial court losses have not added certainty to the PIPE financing
marketplace. On the contrary, the SEC‘s losses, combined with the lack of appellate
decisions on the issue, and the SEC‘s continued Section 5 enforcement actions in the PIPE
context, have created confusion and uncertainty in the financial marketplace.174 This
uncertainty is highlighted by the conclusions of scholarly articles on PIPEs.175 However,
despite the lack of certainty in the financial marketplace, these judicial decisions demonstrate
the flaws in the SEC‘s Section 5 position.

2.

Insider Trading

The SEC also believes a PIPE investor who trades on knowledge of an impending
PIPE transaction is guilty of insider trading. The SEC aggressively enforces its insider
trading position in the PIPE context.176 This position, like the SEC‘s position on
unregistered securities, does not withstand scrutiny.
The SEC‘s position on PIPE investor insider trading is flawed because it does not
require sufficient evidence to establish a breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty necessary
to bring an insider trading claim.177 Additionally, reasonable arguments have been made that
171
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granting motion to dismiss in part).
173
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the SEC‘s position wrongly assumes that knowledge of an impending PIPE transaction is
always material178 and that information regarding an impending PIPE deal is always nonpublic.179 This article will limit its discussion to the fiduciary duty flaw in the SEC‘s position.
Appellate courts have not yet provided much guidance on the issue of PIPE deal
insider trading. The SEC recently brought an enforcement action against Mark Cuban,
owner of the National Basketball Association‘s Dallas Mavericks, related to trades he made
on information of an impending PIPE deal.180 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas dismissed the insider trading case brought against Cuban, 181 and
the SEC recently appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.182
Although Mark Cuban was not a PIPE investor, this case is relevant to PIPE
investors because its central issue is whether trading on information of an impending PIPE
deal qualifies as insider trading. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit declined to reach the
District Court‘s broad holdings regarding insider trading.183
Understanding the problems with the SEC‘s position requires some background on
insider trading. Insider trading is trading while in possession of information that is material,
non-public, and in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to either the shareholders of the
company whose shares are traded or to the information‘s source.184 There is no federal law
or statute that expressly prohibits insider trading.185 Instead, insider trading claims are
brought using Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and related judicial decisions.186 The SEC
seeks to promote market integrity and investor confidence by pursuing insider trading. 187
The Supreme Court has emphasized that investors would be less likely to ―venture their
capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is
unchecked by law.‖188

the offense of insider trading, there have been recent repeated instances in which lower federal courts and the
Securities and Exchange Commission . . . have disregarded these principles.‖).
See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (noting that information is ―material‖ if a reasonable
investor would view the information as having significantly altered the total mix of information available); see also
Berkeley & Troy, supra note 125, at 605 (noting that there is little case law supporting the proposition that a
company‘s plan to seek financing is material).
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The SEC pursues insider trading under two theories: the classical theory and the
misappropriation theory.189 According to the classical theory of insider trading, a defendant
violates Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by trading in possession of
material non-public information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders of
the company whose shares are traded.190 The classical theory of insider trading generally
includes trading by corporate insiders and people such as attorneys and accountants, who
may temporarily be considered corporate insiders, as well as others who temporarily become
fiduciaries of the company.191 ―Liability [under the classical theory] is premised on the
‗relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those
insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that
corporation.‘‖192 This fiduciary relationship gives rise to a ―duty to disclose‖ confidential
information prior to trading.193
Under the misappropriation theory, a defendant violates federal insider trading law
―when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach
of a [fiduciary] duty to the source of the information.‖194 The misappropriation theory is
distinguishable from the classical theory because the classical theory is based on the breach
of a duty to the issuer or its shareholders, while the misappropriation theory is based on the
breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information.
The SEC typically bases its PIPE investor insider trading claims on the
misappropriation theory of insider trading because PIPE investors are not corporate insiders
or ―temporary‖ corporate insiders such as attorneys, accountants, and others who
temporarily become fiduciaries of the company.195
A fiduciary duty cannot be unilaterally thrust upon an individual without consent;
rather, a fiduciary duty must arise with the knowledge and consent of the person to be
bound by the duty.196 A fiduciary duty is ―[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence,
and candor owed by a fiduciary to the beneficiary; a duty to act with the highest degree of
honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the other person.‖ 197
A fiduciary duty does not arise in a normal arms-length transaction, even if the transaction is
related to the issuance or underwriting of securities.198

policy reason for proscribing trading while in possession of material nonpublic information is to make investors
confident that they can trade securities without being subject to informational disadvantages.‖).
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By itself, the receipt of information about an impending PIPE deal is insufficient to
create a fiduciary duty.199 At a minimum, an express contract requiring PIPE investors to
keep the information confidential ought to be required in order to create a fiduciary-like
duty. However, there is some disagreement about whether even a contractual obligation to
keep information confidential is sufficient to create the fiduciary-like duty necessary to
support an insider trading action. Some case law suggests that a contractual obligation of
confidentiality is sufficient to create a fiduciary duty.200 However, some legal scholars believe
that those cases were wrongly decided, and that prior Supreme Court precedent requires
something more than a mere confidentiality agreement.201 These scholars believe that a
confidentiality agreement is not sufficient to create a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty to act
loyally to the source of information.202
The SEC‘s current position is that a confidentiality agreement alone is sufficient to
create the fiduciary duty necessary to support an insider trading claim. This position was
recently examined in SEC v. Cuban.

3.

The Mark Cuban Insider Trading Case

In SEC v. Cuban, the SEC brought a claim against Mark Cuban under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading.203 The SEC alleged that after Cuban agreed to
maintain the confidentiality of a planned PIPE transaction by Mamma.com Inc., he sold his
stock in the company without disclosing to Mamma.com that he intended to trade on this
information.204 By selling his stock, Cuban avoided substantial losses when the Mamma.com
stock price declined following the public announcement of the PIPE deal.205
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In its complaint, the SEC alleged that Cuban owned 600,000 shares of Mamma.com,
approximately a 6% stake in the company.206 In the spring of 2004, Mamma.com decided to
raise capital through a PIPE transaction.207 Once the PIPE deal was close to realization,
Mamma.com‘s CEO decided to inform Cuban, the company‘s largest shareholder, of the
impending deal.208 The CEO prefaced his phone call with Cuban by informing him that he
was about to share confidential information with him.209 Cuban agreed to keep the
information confidential.210 The CEO, relying on Cuban‘s promise to keep the information
confidential, proceeded to inform Cuban of the PIPE deal.211
Cuban was angry upon receiving the news and said he did not like PIPE offerings
because they ―dilute existing shareholders.‖212 Several hours later, Mamma.com‘s CEO sent
Cuban an e-mail with the contact information of the investment bank conducting the PIPE
deal.213 Cuban contacted the investment bank‘s sales representative who supplied Cuban
with confidential information about the transaction.214 One minute after ending his call with
the sales representative, Cuban called his broker and ordered him to sell all 600,000 of his
Mamma.com shares.215 Some of his shares were sold in afterhours trading on June 28,
2004.216 The remainder of Cuban‘s shares was sold during normal trading hours on June 29,
2004.217 After the market closed on June 29, 2004, the PIPE deal was announced to the
public.218
Mamma.com‘s stock price opened at a substantially lower price on June 30, 2004,
and the stock price continued to decline for several days.219 ―Cuban avoided losses in excess
of $750,000 by selling his shares prior to the public announcement.‖220 After the sale,
Cuban filed a required disclosure statement with the SEC and stated that he had sold his
shares because of the company‘s PIPE transaction.221 The SEC responded by bringing an
enforcement action against Cuban.222
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Cuban moved to dismiss the SEC‘s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and under
Rule 9(b) for failing to plead fraud with particularity.223 Cuban argued that the SEC‘s
complaint only alleged that he had entered into a confidentiality agreement with
Mamma.com, and that such an agreement is not sufficient by itself to establish a claim under
the misappropriation theory, ―because the agreement must arise in the context of a
preexisting fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship, or create a relationship that bears all the
hallmarks of a traditional fiduciary relationship.‖224 ―[T]he facts pleaded [did] not
demonstrate that he had such a relationship with Mamma.com.‖225
In Cuban, the district court properly analyzed the fiduciary duty issue: it dismissed
the SEC‘s claim and concluded that the SEC did not adequately allege that Cuban entered
into an agreement sufficient to create the fiduciary duty necessary to establish liability under
the misappropriation theory.226 The court concluded ―that a duty sufficient to support
liability under the misappropriation theory can arise by agreement absent a preexisting
fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship.‖227 However, the court also concluded that the
agreement ―must consist of more than an express or implied promise merely to keep
information confidential.‖228
In Cuban, the district court correctly concluded that to create a duty sufficient to
support liability under the misappropriation theory, an agreement must ―impose on the party
who receives the information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or otherwise using the
information for personal gain.‖229 Furthermore, the district court illustrated why a
confidentiality agreement is not sufficient in distinguishing non-use and confidentiality:
A person who receives material, nonpublic information may in fact preserve
the confidentiality of that information while simultaneously using it for his
own gain. Indeed, the nature of insider trading is such that one who trades
on material, nonpublic information refrains from disclosing that
information to the other party to the securities transaction. To do so would
compromise his advantageous position.230
The district court concluded that Mamma.com‘s agreement did not require Cuban
to abstain from trading on the information of the impending PIPE deal; the agreement only
required Cuban to keep the information confidential.231 Consequently, the district court
correctly dismissed the insider trading charges against Mark Cuban.
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Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to reach the district
court‘s broad holdings regarding insider trading.232 The Fifth Circuit should have affirmed
the decision of the Cuban district court that an agreement can support an insider trading
claim under the misappropriation theory only if the agreement includes both a duty of
confidentiality and a duty of non-use. Affirming the district court‘s decision would have
added certainty, and alleviated the fiduciary duty problem which one commentator stated
―burdens the Commission, courts, and market players because determining if an investor is
in such a relationship is difficult given the present state of the securities laws.‖233
Instead of providing guidance for investors seeking to understand PIPE investor
insider trading actions, the Fifth Circuit avoided the most complex insider trading issues. 234
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court‘s dismissal of the insider trading charges on the
narrow ground that it disagreed with the district court‘s reading of the complaint.235 The
Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings without reaching
the its holdings regarding the necessity of a fiduciary duty in an insider trading complaint
based on the misappropriation theory.236

B. Ignored Benefits and Overstated Risks of PIPEs
The SEC‘s aggressive enforcement ignores the benefits and overstates the risks
associated with PIPE financing. The SEC‘s aggressive enforcement is flawed because it:
ignores the disappearance of death spiral PIPEs from the American marketplace; assumes a
causal connection between PIPE transactions and injury to PIPE issuer shareholders;
ignores the benefits of PIPE financing; and ignores other remedies available for PIPE
issuers and PIPE issuer shareholders.
Death spiral PIPE deals played a major role in the early negative perception of PIPE
financing.237 The disastrous results of early death spirals contributed to the SEC‘s aggressive
enforcement of PIPEs.238 The SEC feared that death spiral PIPE financing presented PIPE
investors with the temptation ―to engage in manipulative short selling of the issuer‘s stock in
order to receive more shares at the time of conversion.‖239 The SEC‘s aggressive
enforcement stance was more reasonable in the context of a PIPE market that included
death spiral PIPEs. The SEC, however, has failed to acknowledge the disappearance of
death spiral PIPEs in the current American marketplace.
The SEC‘s current aggressive enforcement stance, in the context of a PIPE market
that does not include death spiral PIPEs, is less reasonable. Relying on questionable legal
arguments may have been more justified when PIPE issuers and PIPE issuer investors were
experiencing the catastrophic losses of early death spiral PIPEs. But that justification no
longer exists, and the SEC should consider this point in examining its aggressive
232
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enforcement of PIPEs. The absence of death spiral PIPEs, however, is not the only positive
development in the recent PIPE financing market.
The PIPE market has evolved over the last ten years, and many of PIPE financing‘s
developments have been positive. PIPE financing has become more institutionalized. 240
PIPEs now attract ―an extremely diverse group of professional investors, ranging from
Warren Buffet‘s Berkshire Hathaway to traditional mutual fund investors and numerous
hedge funds pursuing an arbitrage or deep value investment platform.‖241 Legal scholars
recognize that the PIPE financing market has evolved into a mainstream financing
alternative that is here to stay.242 This increased institutionalization of PIPE financing is
another factor that should persuade the SEC that its aggressive enforcement of PIPE
investors is no longer helpful.
Furthermore, the SEC‘s aggressive enforcement of PIPE investors incorrectly
assumes a causal connection between PIPE transactions and injury to PIPE issuers. PIPE
issuers often perform poorly subsequent to a PIPE transaction, but this is not surprising
considering the distressed state of most PIPE issuers.243 PIPE issuers have weak cash flow
and poorly performing stocks prior to engaging in PIPE deals.244 More than half of PIPE
issuers will run out of cash within a year, unless they receive additional financing.245 PIPE
issuers were already performing badly prior to PIPE deals; thus, PIPE financing should not
be blamed when PIPE issuers continue to perform badly.
Moreover, the SEC‘s aggressive enforcement against PIPE investors ignores the
benefits of PIPE financing. PIPE financing is a versatile financing option that benefits
PIPE issuers, PIPE issuer shareholders, and PIPE investors.246 This is not to say that PIPE
financing has no weaknesses. Mark Cuban correctly pointed out that the price of existing
equity shares is often diluted by a PIPE offering.247 However, the SEC‘s aggressive
enforcement against PIPE investors would make more sense if PIPE financing was a less
beneficial financing tool, especially given the weak legal ground that the SEC occupies
regarding its Section 5 and insider trading positions.
Without PIPE financing, many PIPE issuers would not be able to raise capital.
Small public companies that have good ideas, but little cash, would most likely go out of
business at a higher rate without the financing alternative that PIPE deals offer.
Consequently, PIPE issuer shareholders derivatively benefit from PIPE financing because
their companies have a better chance of staying in business with access to PIPE deals. PIPE
financing is not a magic pill that can cure all of the problems of PIPE issuers. However, it
Steinberg & Obi, supra note 1, at 25 (―PIPEs today have expanded to include more established issuers who
seek to benefit from the efficiency and cost effectiveness that PIPEs bring to the table.‖).
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can give PIPE issuers a fighting chance to survive long enough to bring good ideas to
market.
Moreover, PIPE financing benefits ―a diverse group of professional investors
ranging from Warren Buffett‘s Berkshire Hathaway to traditional mutual fund investors and
numerous hedge funds pursuing an arbitrage or deep value investment platform.‖248 The
participation of such sophisticated investors benefits all market participants by adding
liquidity to the marketplace by buying and selling assets against market sentiment.249
Lastly, the SEC‘s aggressive enforcement of PIPE investors ignores other remedies
like private litigation that are available to unsatisfied PIPE issuers and PIPE issuer
shareholders. In fact, PIPE issuers have already brought the following types of causes of
action against PIPE investors: common law fraud, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and
federal racketeering violations.250 Fraudulent inducement claims generally involve allegations
that the PIPE investor made material misrepresentations or omitted material facts in
negotiating the purchase agreement.251 PIPE issuers have not experienced much success
against PIPE investors,252 but the existence of these private lawsuits demonstrates that there
are ways to enforce PIPE issuer rights besides SEC enforcement actions.

V.

CONCLUSION

The SEC‘s aggressive enforcement against PIPE financing is misguided. The SEC‘s
positions on PIPE investor short sales are especially troubling because the positions are
based on flawed legal reasoning, and because PIPE financing is a good thing. Small public
companies that are desperate for cash need PIPE financing. In many cases, PIPE financing
is the only financing alternative these companies have. PIPE financing has become a
mainstream financing tool that is too popular to disappear.
Nevertheless, the issues related to PIPE investor short sales are far from settled.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals missed an opportunity to add clarity on the insider
trading issue by affirming the trial court‘s conclusion that an agreement can support a
misappropriation insider trading claim only if the agreement includes both a duty of
confidentiality and non-use. Additionally, the Section 5 unregistered securities issue will
likely continue to cause confusion, until an appellate court has the opportunity to decide the
issue.
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